On the existence of stable roommate matchings
Web3 de nov. de 2024 · Chung K (2000) On the existence of stable roommate matchings. Games Econ Behav 33:206–230. Article Google Scholar Diamantoudi E, Miyagawa E, Xue L (2004) Random paths to stability in the roommate problem. Games Econ Behav 48:18–28. Article Google Scholar http://www.columbia.edu/%7Epc2167/RoommatePbm-29Mars2012.pdf
On the existence of stable roommate matchings
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Web1 de dez. de 1985 · At least one stable matching exists for every stable marriage instance, and efficient algorithms for finding such a matching are well known. The stable … Weblems all feasible matchings that maximize social surplus are stable. This is not true in roommate problems; but we show how any roommate problem can be \cloned" in order to construct an associated bipartite problem. We then exploit this insight to prove existence of stable matchings in roommate problems with even numbers of agents within each type.
Webcumvent the negative existence and computational complexity results in matching theory. We characterize the computational complexity of checking the existence and computing individual-based stable matchings for the marriage and roommate settings. One of our key computational results for the stable marriage setting also Web1 de nov. de 2000 · This paper identifies a condition called “no odd rings” that is sufficient for the existence of stable roommate matchings in the weak preferences case.
Web28 de jun. de 2024 · of existence, complexity and efficiency of stable outcomes, and that of complexity of a social optimum. 1 Introduction It is social dinner time at your preferred conference. The or-ganizers reserved the best restaurant of the city. When you arrive at the place, you see that k tables, of various capac- Web1 de jul. de 2004 · We first show that although stable matchings may not exist, a weakly stable matching always exists in a roommate problem. Then, we adopt a solution …
Web1 de mar. de 2024 · We prove that any roommate problem with externalities has a stable partition and that a stable matching exists if there is a stable partition without odd rings. …
sharon highland obituary tallahasseeWebAlcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(3), pages 417-435, May. sharon hiemstraWebThe theory of stable matchings has become an important subfield within game theory, as documented by the bookofRoth and Sotomayor (1990). Game theorists are interested in the applications of matching theory in real markets. However, the theory of stable matchings also appeal to combinatorialists and computer scientists. Indeed, the first population white paperWebStable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferable and when it is not. We show that when utility is transferable, the existence … population whitehorse yukonWebThe set of envy-free matchings turns out to be a lattice, and the set of stable matchings equals the set of fixed points of a Tarski operator on this lattice. Informally speaking, envy-freeness is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a doctor and an empty position of a hospital. sharon hicklin payneWeb3. Restrictions on preferences that admit stable matchings In their paper, Gale and Shapley (1962) specifically point out that it is not the case that every roommate problem has a stable matching. This has spurred a significant amount of re-search aimed at identifying preference restrictions that grant the existence of stable roommate matchings. sharon hickeyWeb11 de jan. de 2008 · On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings. Kim-Sau Chung; Economics. Games Econ. Behav. 2000; TLDR. It is shown that the process of allowing randomly chosen blocking pairs to match converges to a stable roommate matching with probability one as long as there are no odd rings. Expand. 180. sharon hieter